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ADDICTED MOTHERS, DRUG-EXPOSED BABIES:
THE UNPRECEDENTED PROSECUTION OF MOTHERS UNDER
DRUG-TRAFFICKING STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
It is estimated by the National Association of Perinatal Addiction
Research and Education (NAPARE) that eleven percent of women use
drugs during pregnancy, resulting in 375,000 births of drug-exposed
infants annually.' As frightening as these statistics are, the individual
accounts of the pervasive problem of pregnant drug abusers are even more
profound:
The thing that most disturbed me about what I saw as these
people came out of the doorway was that three of the women who were arrested when police found 90 vials of crack hidden in
a teddy bear in their house - were pregnant. Visibly pregnant.
How could they be poisoning themselves and their babies with
drugs? It was something I had read about, inner-city drug addicts
who gave birth to drug-addicted babies, but I had never seen
them. I had never looked into the eyes of someone so delirious by
drugs that they were laughing as they were being taken away by
police.
The devastating effects of drug exposure on babies are well documented. 3
Since the mid-1980s, state prosecutors have been prosecuting "an
increasing number of women under unprecedented interpretations of child
abuse and drug trafficking statutes." 4
1. See Janet R. Fink, Effects of Crack and Cocaine Upon Infants: A Brief Review of
the Literature, CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J., Fall 1989, at 2. This study was based on an
August 1988 survey of thirty-six hospitals across the country. Id.
2. Laurie Ford, student log entry, submitted to New York University Professor
Richard Petrow, describing the student's experiences while an intern at Channel 12, (Oct.
18, 1990) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
3. See Amy S.Oro & Suzanne D. Dixon, Perinatal Cocaine and Metharphetamine
Exposure: Maternal andNeonatal Correlates, 111 J. PEDIATRICS 571, 574 (1987) (detailing

behavioral disturbances in infants exposed to narcotics and cocaine, including tremors,
irritability, abnormal sleep patterns, and poor feeding); Ira J.Chasnoff et al., Temporal
Patterns of Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 261 JAMA 1741, 1744 (1989) (stating that cocaineexposed children manifest serious neuro-behavioral deficits, possibly affecting long-term
development).
4. The President'sNational Drug Abuse Strategy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong.,
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In July 1989, Jennifer Johnson, then a twenty-three-year-old crack
addict, became the first woman in the country to be convicted of making
an in-utero drug delivery to her baby.' The Florida District Court of

Appeals upheld the conviction in April 1991.! On July 23, 1992,
however, the Supreme Court of Florida unanimously reversed Jennifer
Johnson's conviction. 7 Nevertheless, the trial court's analysis
demonstrates how lower courts across the country have applied drugtrafficking statutes unconstitutionally to mothers of newborn infants.' The

Florida prosecutor relied on a state statute that criminalizes the delivery
of drugs to a minor.9 This statute, which carries a possible thirty-year

sentence,' 0 traditionally has been used against adult drug pushers." The
prosecutor based the Johnson case on the theory that Ms. Johnson
2d Sess. I (1990) [hereinafter ACLU Testimony] (testimony of attorney Lynn Paltrow,
speaking on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union).
5. See Record, State v. Johnson, No. 89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), aff'd,
578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); see also
Jan Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted-and Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990, § 6
(Magazine), at 34, 35 (providing an overview of other prosecutions of drug-addicted
mothers); Tamar Lewin, Court in Florida Backs Guilt for Drug Delivery by Umbilical
Cord, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1991, § 1, at 6 (discussing the court's decision to uphold
Johnson's conviction).
6. See Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So.
2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
7. See Johnson, 602 So. 2d at 1288.
8. See Record, Johnson (No. 89-890-CFA).
9. The Florida statute provides, in relevant part, that
[cxeept as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 18 years of
age or older to deliver any controlled substance to a person under the age of 18
years, or to use or hire a person under the age of 18 years as an agent or
employee in the sale or delivery of such a substance, or to use such person to
assist in avoiding detection or apprehension for a violation of this chapter. Any,
person who violates this provision with respect to:
1. A controlled substance... is guilty of a felony of the first degree....
FLA. STAT. ch. 893.13(1)(c)(1) (1989).
10. Id. ch. 893.13(l)(c).
11. See, e.g., Gelsey v. State, 565 So. 2d 876 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming
a conviction for delivery of a controlled substance where the defendant met with officers
and exchanged crack and cash for powdered cocaine); Roberts v. State, 557 So. 2d 685
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming a conviction for delivery of cocaine where the
defendant sold cocaine to an undercover officer); Newman v. State, 522 So. 2d 71 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affmning a conviction for cocaine trafficking where the purchaser
sampled cocaine, even though cocaine and money were not yet exchanged); see also Wendy
Chavkin, Help, Don't Jail, Addicted Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1989, at A21
(discussing Florida's use of felony drug charges against pregnant women with drug
problems).
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delivered a cocaine metabolite through the infant's umbilical cord during
the sixty-second
period after the child was born but before the cord was
12
severed.

In two similar Michigan cases, Lynn Ellen Bremer and Cheryl Cox
were charged with delivering drugs to their unborn fetuses, but their
charges were dismissed. 13 If the women had been convicted, they would

have faced
minimum jail terms of one year and maximum terms of twenty
14
years.
Part II of this note presents a brief background of the cases involving

criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted women who have exposed their
babies to drugs, along with an overview of recent attempts by state
legislatures to pass legislation in this area. Part III of this note discusses
constitutional issues relating to the criminal prosecution of drug-addicted
women under drug-trafficking statutes, including the novel application of
existing state drug laws to women who give birth to drug-exposed babies.
Part III of this note argues that the use of drug-delivery statutes15 to
punish the mothers of drug-exposed babies violates the mothers' due
process right to fair notice under the Fourteenth Amendment,1" the
mothers' fundamental right to privacy, 7 and the mothers' right to

autonomy in reproductive decision making. 1 This part also argues that

12. See Record at 6, Johnson (No. 89-890-CFA); see also Brief for Appellant at 1,
Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (No. 89-1765) (on file with
the New York Law School Law Review) [hereinafter Johnson's Initial Brief] (summarizing
the prosecution's legal theory); Dorothy E. Roberts, Drug-Addicted Women Wo Have
Babies, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 56 (providing an overview of the constitutional issues
regarding the prosecution of drug-addicted women who have drug-exposed babies).
13. See People v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-PH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991), appeal
denied, 483 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. 1992); People v. Cox, No. 90-53545-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct.
July 9, 1990), aft'd, No. 131-999 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1992).
14. The Michigan statute provides in relevant part:
Except as authorized by this article, a person shall not manufacture, deliver, or
possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance .... (2)
A person who violates this section as to: (a) A controlled substance . . . (iv)
[w]hich is in an amount less than 50 grams, of any mixture containing that
substance is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than 1 year
nor more than 20 years ....
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7401 (1989).
15. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 893.13(1)(e) (1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 333.7401 (1989) (prohibiting the delivery of drugs to a minor).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing, in relevant part, "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
17. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right to
privacy in the marital relationship).
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using these state statutes to prosecute drug-addicted pregnant women
amounts to ex post facto legislation. 19 Last, this part asserts that the
application of the existing state criminal laws to addicted mothers runs
afoul of the constitutional requirements of evidentiary support in criminal
prosecutions,' the guarantees of equal protection under the law, 21 and
the protections against cruel and unusual punishment.'
Part IV of this note examines whether any of the traditional
justifications of criminal punishment are applicable, because "[n]o
questions of criminal justice are more fundamental than the bases for
imposing criminal punishment."' A review of the different theories
demonstrates that rehabilitation is the most plausible justification for
imposing criminal sanctions.'
Part V of this note concludes that rehabilitation should be provided not
as a justification for, but in place of, criminal penalties. This section
argues that drug-treatment programs designed to meet the needs of
pregnant women must be made available, accessible, and affordable.
According to the drug-treatment programs that combine medical and
therapeutic treatment in the form of obstetric, pediatric, and postpartum
gynecologic care, positive results have been reported.'
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that "[nio State sha.., pass any

ex post facto Law").
20. See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (finding that a
criminal conviction "totally devoid of evidentiary support" is unconstitutional under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[n]o state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (providing that "[elxcessive bail shall not be
requiiked, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
23. Kent Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment:
Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 927 (1969).
24. See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
25. See Born Hooked: Confronting the Impact of Perinatal Substance Abuse: Hearing
Before the Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 101st Cong., 1st Seas. 118

(1989) [hereinafter Chavkin Testimony] (statement of Wendy Chavdn, M.D., M.P.H.,
Rockefeller Fellow, Columbia University School of Public Health, mentioning three
successful drug-treatment programs: The Perinatal Addiction Center at Northwestern
Hospital in Chicago, The Family Care Center at Jefferson Hospital in Philadelphia, and The
Program for Pregnant Addicts and Addicted Mothers at Metropolitan Hospital in New York

City).
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II. THE RECENT TREND IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
AND LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS

A. The Prosecutions
The first widely publicized criminal prosecution of a mother for using
drugs during pregnancy was a California case, State v. Stewart.' Pamela
Rae Stewart, an alleged abuser of "street drugs," was prosecuted on the
grounds of criminal child abuse after giving birth to a severely braindamaged son who died six weeks after birth.' The trial court dismissed
the charges because California's criminal child-abuse statute was designed
to punish those who failed to provide necessary clothing, food, shelter,
and financial child support.' The statute was not intended to impose
punishment on women for their prenatal misconduct.' The statutory
definition of "child" was amended to include fetuses so that fathers would
be required to pay their share of pregnancy expenses if they abandoned
their pregnant wives.'
Pamela Rae Stewart became the first of a significant number of
pregnant women in the United States to be charged with criminal child
neglect, abuse, or endangerment." Although one appellate court has
26. No. M508197 (San Diego, Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987); see also Rorie
Sherman, Keeping Babies Free of Drugs, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at 1 (stating that
there has been one conviction for using drugs while pregnant).
27. See Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. at 3; see also Note, Maternal Rights and
Fetal Wrongs: The CaseAgainst the Criminalization of "FetalAbuse," 101 HARV. L. REV.
994 (1988) (arguing that Stewart allegedly abused the fetus by disregarding a physicians
advice to discontinue amphetamine use during her pregnancy, to abstain from sexual
intercourse because she had placenta previa, and to seek immediate medical attention if she
began to hemorrhage).
28. See Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. at 9-11.
29. See id. at 10-11.
30. In 1925, in order to impose a further burden upon the father rather than an
additional burden on the mother, CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (Deering 1925) was amended
to provide that the word "child" included a child conceived but not yet born. Stewart, No.
M508197, slip op. at 7-8. Indeed, the 1925 amendment left the father solely responsible
and imposed an obligation upon the mother only if the father was dead or incapacitated. Id.
at 7. In 1974, the legislature amended the statute again to apply to both parents. Id. at 8.
The legislature's intent in the second amendment was to make both mother and father
equally liable for failing to support their child. Id.; see also Marcia Chambers, Dead
Baby's Mother Faces Criminal Charges on Acts in Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1986,
at A22 (stating that the statute "generally applies to situations in which pregnant women
seek support from husbands who had deserted them").
31. See, e.g., State v. Gethers, No. 89-4454 CF10A (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 1989)
(refusing to charge a woman, who gave birth to a cocaine baby, with aggravated child
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upheld the application of a criminal child-abuse or endangerment statute

against a pregnant woman who used drugs,32 that case was recently
reversed.33 Because a number of courts have held that a fetus is not a

legal person for purposes of the child-abuse statutes,' prosecutors have
focused instead on drug-trafficking statutes. 5
Hence, several recent prosecutions against addicted mothers included
charges of delivering drugs to a minor.' In one such case, Jennifer

abuse because the court ruled that a fetus is not a legal person for purposes of the childabuse statute), aft'd, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Morabito, 580
N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1992) (dismissing an endangering the welfare of a child
charge under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (1) (McKinney 1989), and holding that the statute
does not apply to unborn children); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 714 (Ohio 1992)
(holding that Ohio's child-endangerment statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (A)
(Anderson 1989), does not apply to a mother's substance abuse during pregnancy); State
v. Andrews, No. JU 68459 (Ohio C.P. June 19, 1989) (dismissing child-endangerment
charges because the court refused to include fetus within the definition of child).
32. In Kentucky, a thirty-three-year-old woman was convicted of criminal child abuse
in the second degree after giving birth to a six-pound boy who allegedly suffered from
"neonatal abstinence syndrome." Kentucky v. Welch, No. 90-CR-06 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Mar.
15, 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 90-CA-1189-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1992)
(reversing the criminal child-abuse conviction but affirming the two possession convictions).
33. See Kentucky v. Welch, No. 90-CA-1 189-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); see also Milo
Geyelin & Junda Woo, Law: Conviction of Woman Who Took Drugs While Pregnant Is
Reversed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1992, at B7 (reporting that the reversal is believed to be
the first by an appeals court); Lynn M. Paltrow, Criminal Prosecutions Against Pregnant
Women 16 (Apr. 1992) (report on file with the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project)
(discussing the Welch decision in which the court refused to expand the child-abuse statute
to a woman who took drugs while pregnant).
34. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35. See Chavkin, supra note 11, at A21.
36. See, e.g., State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App.) (unanimously affirming
the dismissal of drug-delivery charges and agreeing with the trial court's determination that
the statute failed to give notice of the crime charged), cert. denied, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 467;
Florida v. Jerez, No. 90-0075-CF-F (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 31, 1990) (reducing drug-delivery
charges from a frst degree to a second-degree felony and dropping child-abuse charges
after Jerez pled guilty; Jerez was sentenced to three-and-a-half-years imprisonment); State
v. Carter, No. 89-6274 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1990), aff'd, 602 So. 2d 995 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (charging Carter with delivery of a controlled substance after her baby tested
positive for cocaine); State v. Black, No. 89-5325 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 3, 1990) (pleading
no contest, Black was the first Florida woman to be sent to jail for delivering cocaine to
a baby through the umbilical cord); State v. Hudson, No. K88-3435-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct.
July 26, 1989) (dropping charges of child endangerment and of delivering cocaine to a
minor, after Hudson pled guilty to possessing cocaine).
Since August 1989, approximately thirty to forty South Carolina women who took
drugs during their pregnancies have been charged with distributing drugs to a minor. See
People v. Bremer, No. 90-32227FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991), appeal denied, 483
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Johnson gave birth to two babies in a three-year period, and both babies
tested positive for cocaine.' Florida Circuit Judge O.H. Eaton, Jr.,
found "that the term 'delivery' includes the passage of cocaine or [a]
derivative of it from the body of a mother into the body of her child
through the umbilical cord after birth occurs." 38 Johnson was convicted

and sentenced to fifteen-years probation. 9 For the probation period, the
court ordered her to participate in a one-year strictly supervised

rehabilitation program, educational and vocational training, and monthly
random drug testing.'

In addition, the court required Johnson to agree

to enroll in an intensive prenatal care program in the event that she

became pregnant again. 4'

In another case, defendant Kimberly Hardy was arrested on drug-

delivery charges shortly after giving birth to her son, Areanis.42
According to an interview with Ms. Hardy, the baby was six-weeks
premature. The doctors, suspecting Hardy's drug abuse, tested the baby's
urine. After the test results proved the presence of cocaine; doctors at
Muskegon General Hospital in Michigan notified the County Department

N.W.2d 371 (Mich. 1992); People v. Cox, No. 90-53545-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9,
1990), aff'd, No. 131999 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1992); see also Commonwealth v.
Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990) (dismissing charges against the
first woman in Massachusetts to be charged under the state's drug-trafficking statute for
distributing cocaine to a newborn baby); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct.
App.) (unanimously ruling that Michigan did not intend its statute prohibiting delivery of
cocaine to children to apply to pregnant drug users), appeal denied, 471 N.W.2d 619
(Mich. 1991); State v. Inzar, Nos. 90-CRS6960, 90-CRS6961 (N.C. Super. Ct. April 9,
1991) (dismissing charges of delivering a controlled substance to a minor and of assault
with a deadly weapon), appeal dismissed, No. 91-16SC778 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 30,
1991).
37. See Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602
So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
38. Record at 366, State v. Johnson, No. 89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989),
af'd, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
39. See Mark Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1990, at 50, 51
(stating that Johnson could have received up to a thirty-year prison term).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.) (unanimously ruling that
Michigan did not intend its statute prohibiting delivery of cocaine to children to apply to
pregnant drug users), appeal denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991); see also Isabel
Wilkerson, Woman ClearedAfter Drug Use in Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1991, at
A15 (stating that Kimberly's behavior did not constitute a criminal delivery of drugs).
43. See 60 Minutes: Kim Hardy May Go to Prison (CBS television broadcast, Nov.
18, 1990) [hereinafter 60 Minutes] (transcript on file at New York Law School Law Review).
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of Social Services." Describing her arrest in an interview, Hardy stated
that "ilt was a nightmare. I was booked, fingerprinted, had my picture
taken. I was shackled for God-knows-whatever reasons and it was all
strange to me because I'd never been in any kind of trouble like that

before. "45
Lynn Bremer, another Michigan woman who faced charges of
delivery of drugs to a minor, was reported to the police by her doctor.'
In an interview, Bremer said that she felt compelled to tell her doctor of
her drug problem because she was concerned about the health of her
baby. 47 Her doctor reported her to the local police after she failed to stay
off drugs." In South Carolina, women have been reported to the
authorities by hospital doctors after giving birth to drug-exposed babies.49
In these cases, the names of women who test positive for cocaine are
turned over to the police. The police arrive shortly after the delivery,
handcuff the women, and take them to jail. °
The prosecution of women in an effort to protect newborns is not
limited solely to cocaine addicts. In the fall of 1989, twenty-nine-year-old
Diane Pfannensteil, who was pregnant, went to a Wyoming hospital for
treatment of injuries inflicted by her husband."1 The local police tested
the alcohol level in her bloodstream and then arrested her as she waited
in the emergency room.5' Pfannensteil was charged under the state's
criminal child-abuse statute for endangering her fetus,53 but the court
dismissed the charges after finding no probable cause.'
44. Hoffman, supra note 5, at 34.
45. 60 Minutes, supra note 43, at 9.
46. Id. at 10.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See ACLU Testimony, supra note 4, at 5-6.
50. See id. at 6.
51. Ellen Goodman, Being Pregnant, Addicted: It's a Crime, CFI. TRIB., Feb. 11,
1990, § 5, at 12.
52. Id.
53. See State's Reply to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Insufficiency of Criminal
Complaint at 2-4, State v. Pfannensteil, No. 1-90-8CRC (Albany, Wyo. County Ct. Feb.
6, 1990).
54. See State v. Pfannensteil, No. 1-90-8CRC (Albany, Wyo. County Ct. Feb. 6,
1990); see also State v. Stewart, No. M508197, slip. op. at 10-Il (San Diego, Cal. Mun.
Ct. Feb. 26, 1987) (recognizing that CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) only applies
under certain circumstances); Case Against PregnantWoman Is Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 1990, at A10 (stating that mother did not pass cocaine to her son in a way "that
constituted criminal delivery of drugs").
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In May 1989, Melanie Green, a twenty-four-year-old Illinois woman,
became the first woman in the country to be charged with involuntary
manslaughter for the death of a two-day-old infant allegedly killed as a
result of the mother's drug use during pregnancy.55 An autopsy revealed
that oxygen deprivation, linked to cocaine exposure late in pregnancy,
caused the death.' In Illinois, involuntary manslaughter is a felony that
is punishable by two to five years in prison. 7 The charges against

Melanie Green were dropped, however, when a grand jury refused to
indict her.58
B. State Legislation
The most common trend for state legislatures is to amend their
existing civil child-neglect laws to prohibit drug use during pregnancy.
States such as Illinois,-' Florida," and Minnesota6 t have enacted such

laws. In 1990, Virginia amended its felony-abuse and child-neglect statute
to criminalize the act of a parent or guardian who causes "serious injury,"

which is defined, inter alia, as the "forced ingestion of dangerous
substances." 62

55. See People v. Green, No. 89-CF-642 (Winnebago County., Ill. Cir. Ct. filed May
8, 1989); see also John Robertson & Lynn Paltrow, 'FetalAbuse": Should We Recognize
It As a Crime?, 75 A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 38 (presenting opposing views about whether
fetal abuse should be recognized as a crime).
56. See Mother ChargedAfter HerBaby Dies of Cocaine, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1989,
at A18. Green was also charged with delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. Id.
57. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3 (1991) (involuntary manslaughter statute);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1991) (sentencing statute).
58. Paltrow, supra note 33, at 15.
59. See Illinois Juvenile Court Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, par. 802-3, § 2-3 (1)(c)
(1989) (defining "neglected or abused minor" as "any newborn infant whose blood or urine
contains any amount of a controlled substance . . . or a metabolite of a controlled
substance").
60. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9) (West 1986) (providing that "harm" to a
child's health or welfare may occur when a newborn infant is born with a physical
dependency on a controlled substance).
61. See MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (Supp. 1989) (defining "neglect" to include "prenatal
exposure to a controlled substance... used by the mother for a nonmedical purpose").
62. See VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-371.1.A. (Michie Supp. 1991). Two cases in Virginia
recently were dismissed, however, under the newly amended statute based on findings that
the statute was not intended to apply to fetuses. See Commonwealth v. Smith, No. CR-91054381 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 1991); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, No. A-44116-01 (Va.
Norfolk Juv. & Dom. Rel. Dist. Ct. Oct. 9, 1991); see also Paltrow, supra note 33, at 3031 (stating that the statute makes criminal the causing of serious injury to a child under
eighteen years of age).
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Other states have sought to institute punitive measures against drugaddicted pregnant women.' Two bills, one in Georgia and another in
Louisiana, sought to make drug use during pregnancy a felony." Both
were defeated.' Another bill, in Rhode Island, sought to expand the
definition of manslaughter to include the death of a child resulting from
drug use by a pregnant woman.' It was also defeated.67
The dichotomy in state'legislative action is evidenced by two bills
introduced in Kansas and Michigan. In Kansas, Republican Representative
Kerry Patrick introduced a bill that would require convicted female addicts
to accept Norplant birth-control inserts, which prevent pregnancies for up
to five years.' Under the proposed law, the state would pay for the $500
procedure, as well as the removal of the insert, if the women stay off
drugs for one year.' In Michigan, Democratic Representative Teola
Hunter sponsored a bill to exclude "postpartum transfer of a controlled
substance by a mother to her child" from the meaning of "delivery" in the
state's controlled-substance laws.' The Hunter bill cleared the House by
a seventy-nine to twenty-two vote7' and, at the time of publication, was
under consideration by the Michigan Senate's Criminal Law and
Corrections Committee.' State legislatures, as well as state prosecutors,
are at odds on how to approach the problems associated with pregnant
drug-addicted women.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
UNDER EXISTING STATE DRUG-DELIVERY STATUTES

Although courts have ruled that a fetus is not a legal person for
purposes of the criminal child-abuse and endangerment statutes, state
prosecutors are utilizing existing drug-delivery statutes to charge pregnant
63. See Memorandum from Kary L. Moss'et al., ACLU Women's Rights Project, to
"interested persons," Update of State Legislation Regarding Drug Use During Pregnancy,
1-2 (May 22, 1990) (on file with New York Law School Law Review).
64. H.B. 1393, 1990 Sess. (Ga.); H.B. 1621, 1991 Sess. (La.).
65. Moss et al., supra note 63, at 2.
66. See H.B. 5108, 1991 Seas. (R.I.).
67. Moss et al., supra note 63, at 2.
68. See James Willwerth, Should We Take Away Their Kids?; Often the Best Way to
Save the Child is to Save the Mother as Well, TIME, May 13, 1991, at 62, 62.
69. See id.
70. See H.B. 5241, 86th Leg., 1991 Sess. (Mich.)
71. See Crackmnom' Bill Clears House, UPI, Nov. 5, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File.
72. See 1991 Mich. H.B. 5241 (SN), in WESTLAW, BILLTRK Database.
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women with delivering cocaine metabolites to their newborns. 3 Jennifer
Johnson's conviction, as well as the potential convictions of similarly
charged women, violates several important constitutional protections.
A. Right to FairNotice
The most flagrant problem with prosecuting drug-addicted women
under drug-delivery statutes is the violation of the right to fair notice in
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.74 This right includes
the "constitutional requirement of definiteness [that] is violated by a
criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that [her] contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." 75 The
basic principle of this right is that the language of a criminal statute must
provide people with a reasonable understanding of a crime before they can
be held criminally responsible for their actions.76
In Bouie v. City of Columbia,7' a South Carolina trespass statute
prohibited non-consensual entry onto private land. 78 The state court
unforeseeably and retroactively enlarged the statute to prohibit, as a
separate offense, the act of remaining on private property after being
asked to leave. 9 The Supreme Court stressed that the South Carolina
Supreme Court, in applying its new construction of the statute, deprived
the petitioner of his right to fair notice of a criminal prohibition and thus
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. s° The
Court expressed concern that the new construction would "lull . . .the
potential defendant into a false sense of security, giving him no reason
even to suspect that conduct clearly outside the scope of the statute as
written will be retroactively brought within it by an act of judicial
construction."" Similarly, in a later case that restated the holding of
Bouie, the United States Supreme Court found that an "unforeseeable
judicial enlargement of a criminal statute narrow and precise on its face
violated the Due Process Clause."'
73. See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[n]o State shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
75. U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
76. See id.
77. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
78. See id. at 349-50.
79. See id.at 350.
80. See id.
81. Id.at 352.
82. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 53 (1975) (citing Boue, 378 U.S. at 353, before
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The State v. Johnson' case provides a good example of this concern.
The Florida drug-delivery statute that prohibits illicit drug delivery to
minors generally has been applied narrowly to adult drug pushers."
According to the defendant's counsel in Johnson,
[t]hroughout its sixteen-year history, the prohibition of delivery
of drugs to a minor has been construed in a fashion comporting
with its plain meaning: individuals have been prosecuted for
handling or arranging the transfer of a controlled substance
outside of his or her own body to a person under the age of
eighteen years.'
Thus, in the Johnson case, Florida's drug-delivery statute was not merely
interpreted more broadly, it was applied in a completely novel fashion. If
the court's interpretation had simply broadened the statute, the statute's
new application would not necessarily have been unconstitutional. For
example, in Rose v. Locke,'s the Tennessee statute proscribing a "crime
against nature"" did not offend the fair-notice requirement found in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court
held that whether the "crime against nature" should be applied narrowly
or broadly was insufficient to uphold a due-process violation.88 In
Wainwright v. Stone,s' the Court determined that a different "crime
against nature" statute' did not violate the requirement of fair notice.91
Although the statute in Wainwright did not list specific prohibited acts, the
conduct that served as the basis for the defendant's convictions had long
been held to constitute a crime under the statute in question.'
Johnson's due-process right to fair notice was violated when Florida
applied its drug-delivery statute in an unforeseeable manner. The statute
distinguishing the Bouie holding as inapplicable to the case at hand).
83. No. 89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), aff'd, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
84. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
85. Johnson's Initial Brief, supra note 12, at 37.
86. 423 U.S. at 48.
87. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1955) (repealed by Act of 1989, ch. 591, § 1).
88. See Rose, 423 U.S. at 50-51.
89. 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (rejecting defendant's claim that the Florida statute's
proscription of "crimes against nature" did not encompass oral and anal sexual activity).
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.01 (West 1965) (repealed by laws of 1974, ch. 74-121,
§ 1).
91. See Wainwright, 414 U.S. at 22.
92. Id. at 22.
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was applied to an entirely new category of conduct. The defendant had no
notice that her actions were unlawful; the court's novel application of the
drug-delivery statute is therefore unconstitutional.
B. Right to Privacy
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also embodies
the fundamental right to privacy.' The application of drug-delivery
statutes to drug-addicted women infringes upon their fundamental privacy
rights, including the right to autonomy in reproductive decision making.
In Johnson, both the state and the trial court viewed the prosecution of the
mother as an attempt to affect a woman's behavior during pregnancy.95
"The State made no claim that Johnson used cocaine as she lay on the
delivery table; all of Johnson's relevant actions took place while she was
pregnant. "'
Regulation of a woman's activities while pregnant infringes upon her
right to privacy in reproductive decision making-a right which was first
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.' The
Griswold Court struck down a statute that prohibited married couples from
using contraceptives; the Court recognized that certain personal decisions
deserve constitutional protection. 98
Later cases, such as Roe v. Wade, 9 reinforced the constitutionally
protected rights of pregnant women and served to limit state regulation of
those rights. In Roe, the Court invalidated a Texas statute that criminalized
all abortions except those that were necessary to save the mothers'
lives."° The Court found that the state had a compelling interest in
protecting the fetus against abortion only in the third trimester, which the
93. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding that the right to
privacy is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the proper
constitutional inquiry into an invasion of privacy is whether the statute infringed on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. Johnson's Initial Brief, supra note 12, at 35.
95. See Record at 368, State v. Johnson, No. 89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13,
1989), aft'd, 578 So. 2d 419, 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla.
1992); Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 420.
96. Johnson's Initial Brief, supra note 12, at 36 n.51.
97. 381 U.S. at 479.
98. See id. at 485-86.
99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
100. See id. at 117-18; see also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4512.1-.6 (West
1992) (acknowledging that sections penalizing the practice of abortion are unconstitutional)
(original version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN., arts. 1191-1196 (1925)).
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Court determined to be the point of fetal viability.1"' The Roe Court
acknowledged that after viability, the state's interest in protecting the fetus
overrides the woman's right to privacy, but prior to fetal viability, a
woman has a fundamental right to choose whether or not to continue her
pregnancy.1 2 While the plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services" explicitly rejected the Roe Court's trimester framework as too
rigid,' 4 and while Planned Parenthood v. Casey" further eroded the
freedom established in Roe,"° a woman's right to reproductive freedom
still remains." °7 Thus, until Roe is directly overturned or chipped away
into a meaningless precedent, a woman's right to make reproductive
choices prior to fetal viability remains free from governmental
interference.
In prosecutions against drug-addicted mothers, "the interpretation of
the delivery statute unavoidably rests on a theory of the State's power to
control women's behavior during pregnancy and to further interests in
fetal health."" The danger in such a policy is that a state may then
decide to regulate such areas as what a pregnant woman eats or drinks,
when she goes to a doctor, or whether or not she has sex during
pregnancy." 9 Limiting pregnant women's activities directly infringes
upon their rights to make decisions during their pregnancies prior to fetal
viability. Applying drug-delivery statutes to pregnant' women would
therefore unconstitutionally infringe upon a woman's right to privacy in
reproductive decision-making.
C. Lack of Evidentiary Support
The conviction of drug-addicted pregnant women for delivering a
controlled substance to a minor lacks evidentiary support. When a criminal
conviction is "totally devoid of evidentiary support," it is unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 ° The
101. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
102. See id. at 154, 163-64.
103. 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (plurality opinion).
104. See id. at 520-21.
105. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
106. See id. at 2821-26.
107. See id. at 2804.
108. Johnson's Initial Brief, supra note 12, at 44.
109. See Note, supra note 27, at 1000. A controversy was created recently when two
Seattle waiters refused to serve an alcoholic beverage to a pregnant woman. The incident
further highlighted the debate over the slippery-slope argument; where is the line drawn?
See Anna Quindlen, Liberty, Autonomy, andDaiquiri,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1991, at El3.
110. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (holding that
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inquiry does not turn on a question of sufficiency of evidence, "but on
whether th[e] conviction rests upon any evidence at all."'
Two

Michigan cases, People v. Hardy2 and People v. Bremer,"3 included

charges of delivery of drugs to a minor and contained serious evidentiary
deficiencies.
"An issue in both the Hardy and Bremer cases was the
preservation of evidence: neither umbilical cord was tested, much less

saved." 115 Additionally, in Johnson, it was not medically established that
a cocaine metabolite passed through the umbilical

cord. 1 6 Dr.

Tompkins, Ms. Johnson's doctor during delivery, admitted he was not
watching the umbilical cord to know whether blood passed through it

because he was preoccupied at the time with other tasks." 7 Furthermore,
although Dr. Tompkins testified that physicians "are in the common
practice of obtaining blood from the umbilical cord after clamping and
cutting it," he could not recall whether a blood sample had been taken
from the cord to test for the presence of cocaine.'
Another expert witness at Johnson's trial, Dr. Kendall, explained that

although it was theoretically possible for a tiny amount of cocaine
metabolite to pass through the baby's umbilical cord after delivery, it was
petitioner's conviction for the two offenses of "loitering" and "disorderly conduct" was so
devoid of evidentiary support as to be invalid under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
111. Id. at 199; see also Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173-74 (1961) (holding
that petitioner's conviction for "disturb[ing] the peace" was so severely lacking evidentiary
support as to be invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
112. 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich.
1991).
113. No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991), appeal denied, 483 N.W.2d
371 (Mich. 1992).
114. See id. at 13 (noting that there was no evidence that the defendant's child was
injured by the cocaine derivative that was found in the child's body); Hardy, 469 N.W.2d
at 52 (noting that the circuit court granted the defendant's motion to quash the charge of
second-degree child abuse on the ground that "there was insufficient evidence that
defendant's ingestion of cocaine ... caused serious physical harm to the child"); see also
Hoffman, supra note 5, at 35 (noting that Dr. Ira Chasnoff, who testified in support of the
defendants in Hardy, does not have much regard for the theory that cocaine could be passed
through the umbilical cord just before the cord is clamped, because "we just don't have that
kind of data").
115. Hoffman, supra note 5, at 53 (italics added).
116. See Record at 24-38, State v. Johnson, No. 89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13,
1989), aff'd, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So.-2d 1288 (Fla.
1992).
117. See id. at22, 26-27.
118. Id. at 37.
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also possible that none was transferred during those crucial seconds. 119
Dr. Kendall testified that a sample of the cord blood was necessary to
determine its components definitively. 1" Thus, evidence that a cocaine
derivative passed through the umbilical cord is non-existent in Johnson's
case. This lack of evidentiary support for the passage of the cocaine is
alarming, given that the conviction rested on the "deliver[y] [of a]
controlled substance to a person under the age of 18 years. "121 "Just as
'[c]onviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due
process,' so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a
[person] without evidence of [her] guilt.""2
D. Ex Post Facto Legislation
The application of drug-delivery statutes to women who give birth to
drug-exposed babies constitutes ex post facto legislation."U The United
States Constitution prohibits the federal 1" and state legislatures1" from
enacting ex post facto legislation. Ex post facto laws were best described
by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull:
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of
the law and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than
the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different testimony, than the law required at the time of the
119. Id. at 234.
120. See id. at 296-97.
121. FiA. STAT. ch. 893.13(l)(c) (1989) (emphasis added).
122. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) (reversing convictions
for loitering and disorderly conduct because of insufficient evidence, and finding that the
conviction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
123. See People v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991), appeal
denied, 483 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. 1992).
124. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (providing that "[n]o... ex post facto Law
shall be passed").
125. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 1 (providing that "[n]o State shall... pass any
ex post facto Law").
126. 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386 (1798).
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commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All
these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppressive.,
Recently, the Supreme Court provided a historical overview of the Ex
Post Facto Clause in Collins v. Youngblood.12 The Court quoted
Blackstone's Commentaries, which states that a law is ex post facto "when
after an action (indifferent in itself) is committed, the legislature then for
the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment
upon the person who has committed it." 1" Although historical
references to the prohibition of increased punishments were not
documented by the Collins Court, it held that increased punishments are
also prohibited."3 The Court found that "[t]he enhancement of a crime,
or penalty, seems to come within the same mischief as the creation of a
crime or penalty."1
A Michigan trial court found a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause
when the State prosecuted a drug-addicted mother under the state's drugdelivery statute.132 In his opinion, Judge Thomas S. Eveland first
determined that the defendant did not have fair notice that her conduct was
forbidden under the statute. 3 Thereafter, Judge Eveland asserted that
"[tlhis Court cannot expand or enlarge the ordinary and logical application
of the law. To do so would be in violation of the ex post facto laws
prohibited by Article I of the Constitution.""
The Johnson case provides a classic illustration of the unconstitutional
application of an ex post facto law. Other than the crime charged, the
most serious crime Johnson would likely have been charged with, as a
drug user, was possession of a controlled substance. 35 Under Florida's
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control statute, "[i]t is unlawful for any
person to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled
substance."" Possession of a controlled substance is a third-degree
127. Id. at 390.
128. 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2719 (1990)
129. Id. at 2720 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46).
130. See id.
131. Id. (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 397).
132. See People v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1991), appeal
denied, 483 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. 1992).
133. See id.slip op. at 10.
134. Id. slip op. at 11; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (providing that "[n]o
ex post facto Law shall be passed."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. (providing that
...
"[n]o State shall... pass any... ex post facto Law .....
135. See FLA. STAT. ch. 893.13(1)(f) (1989).
136. Id.
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felony.137 Johnson's prosecution under Florida's drug-delivery statute,
although necessarily based upon her cocaine possession and use during
pregnancy, is punishable as a first-degree felony.13 Thus, the
prosecution "aggravates a crime, or makes it. greater than it was, when
committed"139 by elevating the crime from a third-degree to a firstdegree felony. By applying this statute in such a novel fashion, the
prosecution has devised an ex post facto law.
E. Equal Protection Clause
The exclusion of men from prosecution under a state's criminal drugdelivery statute may violate the Equal Protection Clause. 1" The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides protection for
individuals from discrimination based upon their race, gender, alienage,
and national origin. 4 ' The Equal Protection Clause, among other
constitutional safeguards, protects women from discrimination on the basis
of gender.142 The state statutes prohibiting the delivery of drugs to a
minor do not appear to be facially violative of the Equal Protection Clause
because men, as well as women, may be convicted under the language of
the statute. Yet, a statute, although not invalid on its face, is
unconstitutional if it is applied in a discriminatory fashion.
Only
women can be prosecuted for delivery of illegal substances to a minor via
the umbilical cord. Discrimination based upon gender is prohibited by the
137. Id.
138. See Johnson's Initial Brief, supra note 12, at 1.
139. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
140. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws").
141. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that women
in the armed services had the same rights to housing benefits as their male counterparts);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that a municipal ordinance, which
made arbitrary and unjust distinctions based on race, color, or nationality, violates the
Equal Protection Clause).
142. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (finding an Idaho statute that gave
preferred status to males in applications and appointments to estate administrator positions
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); Frontiero,

411 U.S. at 688 (holding that federal laws allowing only male members of the armed
services automatically to claim their spouses as dependents violated the Equal Protection
Clause).
143. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373 (holding that any law that is nondiscriminatory on
its face may, when applied in a discriminatory fashion, violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Equal Protection Clause; thus, the drug delivery statutes "as applied" are
unconstitutional. 1"
Undercutting this argument, however, is the Supreme Court's decision
that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy does not discriminate against
women, but instead rationally discriminates between pregnant people and
non-pregnant people. 1" Although this is the current state of the law,
many maternal rights advocates argue that accepting reproductive
differences as a permissive basis for differential treatment is

unconstitutional.'

6

Clearly, men are not similarly situated to women in

these cases because men cannot transmit drug metabolites to a newborn

via the umbilical cord. The drug-delivery statutes "as applied," however,
overlook the fact that drug or alcohol use by males may adversely affect

their sperm, which, in turn, may result in harm to a fetus and ultimately
the delivered child. 47

144. Dawn E. Johnsen, FromDriving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant
Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 204 (1989) (stating that penalties
imposed solely against pregnant women discriminate on the basis of gender and therefore,
only those that are supported by an "exceedingly persuasive justification" should be deemed

constitutional).
145. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494, 496 n.20 (1974) (finding that
excluding normal pregnancy-related expenses from state disability-insurance coverage is not
gender discrimination). But see generally Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrugAddicts Who
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1419, 1450-56 (1991) (arguing that prosecutions of pregnant drug users violate the Equal
Protection Clause on both gender and racial bases because most pregnant drug-addicted
women are of African-American descent); Ron Winslow, Black Pregnant Women FarMore
Likely Than Whites to be Reported for Drug Use, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 1990, at 7D
(referring to a study that reported that a black woman is 9.6 times more likely than a white
woman to be reported for substance abuse during pregnancy).
146. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with
Women's ConstitutionalRights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J.
599, 620-25 (1986) (arguing that laws that disadvantage people on the basis of pregnancy
apply only to women and thus should be seen as gender discrimination); Lynn Paltrow,
When Becoming Pregnant Is a Crime, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1990, at 41,
45 (arguing that restricting prosecutions to pregnant women may violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection because any government action that singles out
women for special penalties solely because they are pregnant discriminates on the basis of
gender).
147. See Katha Pollitt, "FetalRights, " A New Assault on Feminism, 250 NATION 409
(1990) (acknowledging that a man's use of drugs, alcohol, and prescription medications,
and his exposure to work-place contaminants play a part in determining the quality of his
sperm and affect the course of fetal development).
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F. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Lastly, the prosecution of pregnant mothers for delivering drugs to
their unborn children amounts to cruel and unusual punishment and
violates the Eighth Amendment.'" In Robinson v. California,' the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a California
misdemeanor statute that criminalized the status of being "'addicted to the
use of narcotics,'" which was punishable by imprisonment." The
Supreme Court held that punishing someone suffering from the illness of
addiction, without a finding of any related criminal act, is cruel and
unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.' The crux of the Court's decision was that an
addiction to narcotics is not an affirmative "act," but rather a condition or

"status, "152 not punishable as a crime.

The Court in Robinson accepted the admission by the state's counsel
that narcotics addiction is a mental and physical illness."' Addiction as
an illness was further defined by Justice Douglas in his concurrence: "I
do not see how under our system being an addict can be punished as a
crime. If addicts can be punished for their addiction, then the insane can
also be punished for their insanity. Each has a disease and each must be
treated as a sick person."" s Indeed, as far back as 1925, the Supreme
Court recognized that persons addicted to narcotics "are diseased and
proper subjects for medical treatment."'o5 It appears, however, that
Jennifer Johnson, Cheryl Cox, Lynn Bremer, and other women arrested
for delivering drugs to minors were charged because of their ."status" as
addicts.
The thrust of the Robinson Court's interpretation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause is "that criminal penalties may be inflicted
only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some
behavior, which society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in
historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus.""a The
148. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
149. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (plurality opinion).
150. Id. at 660 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1955 & Supp.

1961) (repealed 1972)).
151. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
152. Id. at 662.
153. See id. at 667.
154. Id. at 674 (Douglas, J., concurring).

155. Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (holding that a narcotics law
criminalizing the transfer of drugs was inapplicable when a physician, acting according to
fair medical standards, gave an addict a moderate amount of drugs to detoxify the addict).
156. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (plurality opinion) (affirming a
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only "act" for which Jennifer Johnson was convicted was giving birth to

a child.
The Robinson Court found that the act of using, purchasing, selling,

or possessing

narcotics

was

the

reason to

impose

criminal

sanctions 157-not the natural involuntary "act" of giving birth or feeding
a baby through the umbilical cord.' 58 Jennifer Johnson, however, was
not convicted for using, purchasing, selling, or possessing narcotics; she

was convicted for delivering drugs to a minor. 1 9 The Robinson Court
found that punishing a person for the mere "status" of being an addict is
cruel and unusual punishment." The indictment and conviction of new
mothers for their drug-addicted -status is, therefore, cruel and unusual

punishment which violates the Eighth Amendment.""

IV. THE LACK OF CRIMINAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPOSING
PUNISHMENT ON DRUG-ADDICTED MOTHERS

Prosecutions of drug-addicted pregnant women lack penological
justification. As discussed above, the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits punishment for a status offense. 62
The Supreme Court has interpreted this Clause in a flexible and dynamic
manner, extending its interpretation beyond the barbarous and inhuman
physical punishments at issue in the Court's earliest cases."
conviction for public intoxication and finding that the appellant was punished for public
drunkenness on a particular occasion, not for the status of being a chronic alcoholic).
157. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664.
158. An involuntary act cannot be the basis for criminal liability. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.01 (1962) (stating that a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the
effort or determination of the actor is not a voluntary act); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. Sco~r, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2(c) (2d ed. 1986) (stating that criminal
liability requires that the activity in question must be voluntary).
159. Record at 365-66, State v. Johnson, No. 89-890-CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13,
1989), aff'd, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla.
1992).
160. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
161. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
162. See supra notes 148-61 and accompanying text.
163. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding that
"the Clause forbidding 'cruel and unusual' punishments 'is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice'" (quoting
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910))); see also Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (finding "that the limits of the Eighth Amendment's proscription
are not easily or exactly defined ....

that the applicable standards are flexible,

...

and

that broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency are
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Accordingly, punishments incompatible with "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" have been held to
be repugnant to the Eighth Amendment. 1" Thus, a punishment may be
cruel and unusual if the sanction imposed is "totally [devoid of]
penological justification."" For example, "[c]apital punishment has also
been attacked as violative of the Eighth Amendment on the ground that it
is not needed to achieve legitimate penal aims and is thus 'unnecessarily
cruel. ' "" The following subsections discuss whether sound bases exist
for imposing criminal punishments on drug-addicted pregnant women.
A. Theories of Punishment
The purpose of the criminal law is to protect members of society and
to prevent undesirable conduct. 67 "Since punishment involves pain or
deprivation that people wish to avoid, its intentional imposition by the
state requires justification."" Thus, the justifications of punishment
should help explain why society is warranted in imposing it.W There are
several theories that seek to justify punishment.
The traditional theories of punishment include retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation." Retribution can be defined as "the
intentional infliction of pain and suffering on a criminal to the extent he
deserves it because he has willingly committed a crime."' Under a
theory of general deterrence, "the sufferings of the criminal for the crime
he has committed [is] supposed to deter other[]" people in the general
population from committing future crimes for fear of receiving similar
treatment.' "Rehabilitation is the acquisition of skills or values which
useful and usable").
164. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that depriving a soldier of
United States citizenship for escaping from an army stockade and becoming a deserter for
one day was cruel and unusual punishment).
165. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion).
166. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 391 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
167. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 21 (4th ed. 1972).
168. Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336,
1337 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
169. See Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison:Experiences
of Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1149, 1165 (1990).
170. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 167, at 271-72.
171. Blecker, supra note 169, at 1150.
172. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 167, at 23.
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convert [the] criminal into a law-abiding citizen." 73 Incapacitation
protects society from persons deemed dangerous by virtue of their past
criminal acts by isolating them from society.' 74
Much literature on the subject of punishment tends to advocate one
particular theory while excluding the others.' 75 For example, "[t]hose
who espouse[ the rehabilitation theory condemnl the rest, those who
favor[] the deterrence theory den[y] the validity of all others." 76 An
integrative approach, however, known as the "inclusive theory," takes into
consideration all of the traditional theories of punishment.' 7 Thus, more
than one theory demands attention when analyzing the criminalization of
a particular act. The analysis in the following section will focus on each
theory of punishment to determine whether any of them justify the
criminalization of drug use during pregnancy.
1. Retribution
In May 1991, when Illinois State Senator Richard Kelly was preparing
to introduce legislation establishing criminal penalties for illegal drug use
during pregnancy, he stated that "there has to be some punishment if
someone harms an innocent life." 7" Minnesota Representative Kathleen
Blatz stated that "at some point we cannot be reluctant to punish people
who make those decisions" to harm their fetuses by taking drugs during
pregnancy."' Under the theory of retribution, the "good" that is
achieved by punishment has nothing to do with the prevention of future
crimes. Instead, "the good that punishment achieves is that someone who
deserves it gets it."" ° Retributivism, therefore, rests on the notion that
a criminal is receiving what he or she deserves. Critical to retributive
theory is the underlying assumption that human beings possess free will
and that their conduct is not manipulated by external factors.'
173. Blecker, supra note 169, at 1150.
174. See LAFAVE & SCOTT,supra note 167, at 22.
175. See id. at 27.
176. Id.
177. See JEROME HAML, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 303-04 (2d ed.
1960); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 167, at 24.
178. Eileen McNamara, Fetal Endangerment Cases on the Rise, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
3, 1989, at 11 (quoting Illinois State Senator Richard Kelly).
179. Barbara Whitaker, Protecting Baby From Mom: Tot Welfare at Issue in Drug
Cases, NEWSDAY, Nov. 6, 1989, at 32 (quoting Minnesota Representative Kathleen Blatz).
180. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 235 (1984).
181.

See JOSHUA DRESsLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1987).
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The views of philosopher Immanuel Kant support a pure retributivist
theory." s According to Kant, the punishment of criminals is a good in
and of itself, in addition to whatever side effects it may have on
society."ls Kant's claim, that an island society about to disband should
still execute the last murderer remaining in prison, is an illustration of this
viewpoint.'" Before any consideration is given to the utility of the
punishment, an individual "must first be found to be deserving of
punishment." 1" Kant stated that
[j]udicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to
promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil
society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only
on the ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being
can never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of
someone else ....156
Thus, Kant views punishment as an end unto itself-the deliberate
infliction of pain and suffering upon those who deserve it.
J.D. Mabbott, a legal scholar and another retributivist, stated that it
is "essential to a legal system that the infliction of a particular punishment
should not be determined by the good that particularpunishment will do
either to the criminal or to 'society.'"" 7 Mabbott believes that a law
presents a choice and an individual assumes freedom and responsibility
with regard to the law."' According to Mabbott and the retributivists,
punishment is a corollary of law-breaking and the criminal makes the
essential choice: "[s]he brings it on [her]self." 5 9 Although a law may
182. See Greenawalt, supra note 168, at 1338.
183. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100-01 (John

Ladd trans., 1965).
184. See id. at l02.
Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its
members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island decided to separate and
disperse themselves around the world), the last murderer remaining in prison
must first be executed, so that everyone will duly receive what his actions are
worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because
they failed to insist on carrying out the punishment ....
Id.
185. Id. at 100.
186. Id.
187. J.D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 162-63 (1939).
188. See J.D. Mabbott, Freewill and Punishment, in CONTEMPoRARY BRITISH
PHILOSOPHY289, 303 (3d Series, H. Lewis ed., 1956).
189. Mabbott, supra note 187, at 161.
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threaten an individual, Mabbott asserts, the only thing that justifies
punishment, something for which the legislator is not responsible, is the
exercise of free choice by the individual."' ° Mabbott's focus on the
individual's free will is the point at which the theory of retribution falls
dangerously below the line of acceptability when applied to drug use
during pregnancy. The addict or alcoholic does not exhibit a "free choice"
when picking up a drink or a drug."9 ' The retributivists could never
justifiably punish a person for doing an act that could not be controlled by
the actor.9 2
If one accepts the premise that drug addiction is a disease, it is easy
to see how the retributivist theory misses the mark. Alcoholism is
currently accepted as a disease by the American Medical Association and
the National Council on Alcoholism."9' In Powell v. Texas," Justice
Fortas quoted the National Council on Alcoholism, which defined an
alcoholic as a "person who is powerless to stop drinking and whose
drinking seriously alters his normal living pattern.""' In Powell, expert
testimony by a doctor concluded that a "'chronic alcoholic' is an
'involuntary drinker,' who is 'powerless not to drink,' and who 'loses his
self-control over his drinking.''" In his dissent, Justice Fortas wrote
"that alcoholism is caused and maintained by something other than the
moral fault of the alcoholic, something that, to a greater or lesser extent
depending upon the physiological or psychological makeup and history of
the individual, cannot be controlled by him."" 9 Others in the medical
and legal
profession have accepted the concept of alcoholism as a
198
disease.
190. See Mabbott, supra note 188, at 303.
191. Helene M. Cole, M.D., Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered
Medical Treatments and Legal Penaltiesfor Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant
Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990) (stating the AMA's position that "it is clear that
addiction is not simply the product of a failure of individual willpower").
192. See DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 8.
193. See AMA, MANUAL ON ALCOHOLISM 3 (3d ed. 1977) (stating that alcoholism
is an illness); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM, WHO SAYS ALCOHOuSM IS A
DISEASE? 1-3 (1988) (supporting the concept that alcoholism is a disease).
194. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
195. Id. at 560 n.3 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (quoting the National Council on
Alcoholism).
196. Id. at 518 (plurality opinion) (quoting the testimony of Psychiatrist David Wade).
197. Id. at 561 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
198. See generally ELVIN M. JELUNEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOuSM

(1960) (analyzing opinions and attitudes concerning the disease concept of alcoholism and
noting its acceptance by the public and professional communities); Warren Lehman,
Alcoholism, Freedom, and MoralResponsibility, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 103 (1990)
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Although cocaine and drug addiction have not been accepted as, a
disease by the American Medical Association, the World Health

Organization lists drug addiction in the International Classification of
Diseases. 1" The Supreme Court accepted the concept of drug addiction
as a disease as far back as 1925.' The same sense of powerlessness

and loss of self-control associated with alcoholism is exhibited with drug
addiction. 1 The idea, therefore, that a pregnant woman who is addicted
to drugs freely chooses to harm herself and her fetus is not tenable under

the theory that drug addiction is a disease.' In addition, an ordinary
connotation of the "term disease [is] that it is a condition not acquired
through the moral fault of the sufferer."' Thus, to punish a woman for
uncontrollable behavior for which she is not morally at fault is the
antithesis of the main tenet of the theory of retribution.
The American Medical Association issued a report opposing the use
of criminal prosecutions to deal with the problem of drug use during
(defending the theory that alcoholism is a disease or at least an illness). But see HERBERT
FINGARETTE, HEAVY DRINKING-THE MYTH OF ALCOHOISM AS A DISEASE (1988)
(arguing that drinking is conduct that is normally controllable by the drinker; persons
labelled "alcoholic" can often control their drinking for substantial periods of time);
Herbert Fingarette, Alcoholism: Can Honest Mistake About One's Capacityfor Self Control
be an Excuse?, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 77 (1990) (stating that alcoholism is not a
disease and that an alcoholic's intoxication is therefore voluntary).
199. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., MANUAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL

CLASSIFCATION OF DISEASES, INJURIES, AND CAUSES OF DEATH 198 (1977). Section 304
defines drug dependence as
[a] state, psychic and sometimes also physical, resulting from taking a drug,
characterized by behavioral and other responses that always include a compulsion
to take a drug on a continuous or periodic basis in order to experience its psychic
effects, and sometimes to avoid the discomfort of its absence. Tolerance may or
may not be present. A person may be dependent on more than one drug.
Id. at 198-99.
200. See Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (stating that addicts are
"diseased" and are "proper subjects for [medical] treatment").
201. See AMA, supra note 193, at 4 (stating that alcoholism is also manifested as a
type of drug dependence that ordinarily interferes with a patient's mental health).
202. See Wendy K. Mariner et al., Pregnancy, Drugs, and the Perils of Prosecution,
9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICs, Winter/Spring 1990, at 30, 36 (arguing that continued use of drugs
by pregnant addicts is rarely, if ever, truly voluntary because drug-addicted mothers do not
want to harm their fetuses); Cole, supra note 191, at 2667 (stating that "[i]n all but a few
cases, taking a harmful substance such as cocaine is not meant to harm the fetus but to
satisfy an acute psychological and physical need for that particular substance").
203. Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 947.
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m '
pregnancy and its potential harm to the newborn
emphasized that

The report

[i]ndividuals who are substance dependent have impaired
competence in making decisions about the use of that substance.
Punishing a person for substance abuse is generally
ineffective because it ignores the impaired capacity of substanceabusing individuals to make decisions for themselves ...
If a
pregnant woman suffers from a substance dependency, it is the
physical impossibility of avoiding an impact on fetal health that
causes severe damage to the fetus, not an intentional or malicious
wish to cause harm.'

If a person is an addict, and thus suffers from an illness, it is neither
plausible nor fair under the theory of retribution to impose punishment.
One comment made by an American Civil Liberties Union attorney
summarizes this viewpoint succinctly:
Narcotics addiction is an illness, not a crime. Conceptualizing
narcotics use as a willful abuse of self and others that can
successfully be controlled through the imposition of criminal
sanctions mischaracterizes the nature of the disease, and results
in a state response that is punitive and [that] fails to meet the
needs of drug-addicted women.'
2. General Deterrence
Michigan prosecutor Tony Tague maintains that a major goal of
criminal prosecution is to bring women into treatment. "When physicians
make suggestions, it doesn't appear that's enough for them to seek
treatment. The possibility of prosecution is a strong incentive." 7
Charles Condon, the South Carolina Solicitor, stated that "[w]e're not
really interested in convicting women and sending them to jail.... We're
just interested in getting them to stop using drugs before they do
something horrible to their babies."'
204. See Cole, supra note 191.
205. Id. at 2667-68.
206. Katy L. Moss, Legal Issues: Drug Testing of Postpartum Women and Newborns
as the Basis for Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1406, 1413
(1990).
207. Hoffman, supra note 5, at 55 (quoting Prosecutor Tony Tague).
208. Tamar Lewin, Drug Use in Pregnancy:New Issuesfor the Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 1990, at A14 (quoting South Carolina Solicitor Charles Condon).
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Under general deterrence, "punishment should not be designed to
exact retribution on convicted offenders but to deter the commission of
future offenses."' One view of deterrence theory espoused by Jeremy
Bentham,21° an English utilitarian,"' assumes that people are rational
and that people choose between possible activities based on a calculation
of risks of pain and pleasure.2" According to Bentham, "[w]hen a man
perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted
upon in such a manner as tends, with a certain force, to withdraw him, as
it were, from the commission of that act."213 One of the chief criticisms
of this view, as pointed out by Bentham himself, is "that a spirit of
calculation has place among the passions of men, who it is said, never
calculate."' 14 This criticism of the deterrence theory is applicable to the
present issue of convicting drug-addicted women who become pregnant.
Similar to the argument made against retribution, it is illogical to conclude
that an addict is going to weigh the costs of her action.215
The reality is that drug-addicted pregnant women are being driven
away from seeking help from doctors because of the threat of prosecution.
After Pamela Rae Stewart was arrested under California's criminal childabuse statute, several women explicitly expressed, to their health care
workers, their fear of being reported to the police. 16 Some women
refused to seek drug treatment because of their fear of prosecution.217
The Perinatal Center for Chemical Dependence at Northwestern University
School of Medicine reported numerous cases of women calling to say they
would rather stop treatment than risk possible prosecution. 1 8 Gladden
V. Elliot, M.D., President of the California Medical Association, testified
that
209. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PRoCESSES 149 (5th ed. 1989).
210. See 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 280 (3d ed. 1967).
211. Classic utilitarian theory espouses the view that inflicting punishment or pain on
anyone is senseless unless some benefit will be obtained from it. Punishment serves to
reduce crime because individuals generally act rationally and avoid proscribed behavior that

carries unpleasant consequences. See DRESSLER, supra note 181, at 10.
212. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in I THE WORKS OP JEREMY
BENTHAM 396 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 402.
215. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
216. See ACLU Testimony, supra note 4, at 13.
217. See id.
218. See id.at 14.
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"[w]hile unhealthy behavior cannot be condoned, to bring
criminal charges against a pregnant woman for activities which
may be harmful to her fetus is inappropriate. Such prosecution is
counterproductive to the public interest as it may discourage a
woman from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from providing
accurate information to health care providers out of fear of selfincrimination. This failure to seek proper care or to withhold vital
information concerning her health could increase the risks to
herself and her baby." 19
Thus, punishing a woman for her drug abuse is not an effective way of
alleviating her drug dependency or preventing future abuse by herself or
others.m
Lynn Bremer, who faced charges of delivery of drugs to a minor, felt
compelled to tell her doctor about her drug problem, even though friends
warned her not to." Ms. Bremer said, "Jp]eople told me not to tell
anybody about my drug usage. You know, people said, '[d]on't tell
anybody or you'll end up like Kim Hardy,' but I felt I had to."I After
Bremer's doctor told her to stop using drugs and she could not, he
reported her to Child Protective Services.' Bremer believes that the
"threat of going to prison will scare women away from getting any kind
of prenatal care."' Many women will choose not to confide in their
doctors about a drug addiction if that information will be used to prosecute
them at another time.'
3. Rehabilitation
Jeff Deen, the lawyer who prosecuted Jennifer Johnson, believes that
prosecution is the only way to stop cocaine use.' Speaking about
Jennifer Johnson, Deen said that "[sihe wasn't doing anything to help
herself. The arrest is what motivated her to get help that she wasn't
getting on her own." 2
219. Cole, supra note 191, at 2669 (quoting testimony of Gladden V. Elliot in
California v. Stewart, Civ. No. 575396 (San Diego, Cal. Mun. Ct. 1987)).
220. See id. at 2667.
221. See 60 Minutes, supra note 43, at 10.
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. Id. at l1.
225. See Cole, supra note 191, at 2667.
226. See Curriden, supra note 39, at 51.
227. Id.
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Rehabilitation is the most plausible justification for criminalizing drug
use during pregnancy. Rehabilitative treatment benefits offenders by
changing their attitudes through counseling, education, vocational training,
Rehabilitation or
and medical and psychological treatment.'
reformation is a process by which "enlightened" criminals learn to
consider themselves valuable members of society and to function
productively and lawfully. 9
Unfortunately, in light of the recent prosecutions against drug-addicted
women, many are undergoing an "enlightening" process as a criminal.
Jennifer Johnson sought rehabilitative measures in Florida prior to her
arrest, but she was turned away.' At the time Kim Hardy was
pregnant, no drug-treatment programs existed in her area that were
designed specifically for the needs of pregnant addicts. 1
Wendy Chavkin, a faculty member at the Columbia University School
of Public Health, released a 1988 study, of seventy-eight New York City
drug-treatment programs, that revealed that fifty-four percent of these
programs excluded pregnant women, sixty-seven percent refused to admit
pregnant women who paid with Medicaid, and eighty-seven percent
excluded pregnant women who were also addicted to crack. 3 The
director of Family and Children's Services for the San Francisco
Department of Social Services, Ann O'Reilly, stated that "if these mothers
were walking away from treatment [in San Francisco], I might feel
differently, but they are not walking away from treatment - they're
walking away from waiting lists." 23 Thus, pregnant women, especially
those who are poor and addicted to cocaine, have little help available to
them.' Additionally, many drug-treatment programs that do exist are
designed to treat the male heroin addict and consequently have maleoriented modes of treatment.' Most rehabilitation centers are not
228.
229.
230.
231.

See JEROME HALL Er AL, CRIMINAL LAW 711 (4th ed. 1983).

See Blecker, supra note 169, at 1197.
See Lewin, supra note 208, at A14.
See 60 Minutes, supra note 43, at 11.

232. See Wendy Chavkln, DrugAddiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM.

J.PUB. HEALTH 483, 485 (1990). Less than 20% of the drug-treatment programs in the
Washington D.C. area admit pregnant women that are poor or depend on Medicaid. See
Michele L. Norris, Cries in the Dark Often Go Unanswered: ForDrug-Addicted Mothers,
Treatment is Hard to Find, Even Harderto Stick With, WASH. POST, July 2, 1991, at Al,

A8.
233. Susan LaCroix, Birth of a Bad Idea: JailingMothersfor Drug Use, 248 NATION

585, 588 (1989).
234. See Cole, supra note 191, at 2669.
235. Many studies have addressed the lack of special treatment modes for women. See,
e.g., Beth G. Reed, Developing Women-sensitive DrugDependence Treatment Services:
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designed to meet the specific psychological and physiological needs of

women and do not teach them the skills necessary to take care of newborn

children. 6
In light of the difficulty experienced by poor women in gaining access
to treatment centers,2 37 it is ironic that women must be made criminals
before they can receive treatment. Jennifer Johnson was admitted to a
treatment facility as part of her sentence. 3 As one author recently

expressed, "creating a new crime for the sole purpose of getting pregnant
women into treatment stands the goal of rehabilitation on its head ...

This is not rehabilitation. It is using the criminal law to gain access to
social services. " "

Rehabilitation would be a legitimate justification for imposing criminal
sanctions if women were not pursuing help on their own and if adequate
Why So Difficult?, 19 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS, Apr.-June 1987, at 151 (examining the
reasons for a lack of progress in reaching out to, and providing gender-sensitive treatment
services for women experiencing problems with alcohol and other drugs); Sally Stevens et
al., Women Residents: Expanding Their Role to Increase Treatment Effectiveness in
Substance Abuse Programs,24 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 425 (1989) (advocating the use of a
female-based therapeutic model, which after implementation, had favorable results for both
male and female populations); Beth G. Reed, DrugMisuse and Dependency in Women: The
Meaning and Implications of Being Considered a Special Population or Minority Group,
20 INTL J. ADDICTIONS 13 (1985) (stating that prevention, outreach, and treatment
recommendations should be tailored to the needs of female drug abusers); Tom Doshan &
Charles Bursch, Women and Substance Abuse: Critical Issues in Treatment Design, 12 J.
DRUG EDUC. 229 (1982) (recommending components of treatment to include women-only
therapy groups, assertiveness training, social skills training, attention to child-care issues,
and outreach activities).
236. See Cole, supra note 191, at 2669.
237. See Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., 1o. 6230/90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 31, 1991), rev'd, 580 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1992). The American Civil Liberties
Union's Women's Rights Project brought a class action suit on behalf of pregnant addicts
against several drug-treatment programs in New York City for denying equal access to
detoxification-treatment facilities solely because the addicts were pregnant. To date, two
of the defendants have settled with plaintiffs. Id. at 3. The complaint has been dismissed
as to Joint Diseases North General Hospital. See Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. Gen.
Hosp., 580 N.Y.S.2d 246 (App. Div. 1992). St. Barnabas Hospital, Bronx-Lebanon
Hospital Center, and Puerto Rican Organization to Motivate Enlighten and Serve Addicts,
Inc. remain as defendants on the date of this note's publication.
238. See Mariner et al., supra note 202, at 37.
239. Id.
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services were available.?' Because rehabilitative services are effectively
non-existent for the cocaine-addicted woman, however, rehabilitation via
criminal prosecution is unwarranted.
4. Incapacitation
Florida Prosecutor Jeff Deen stated that Johnson "'had used up all her
chances. [The state] need[s] to make sure this woman does not give birth
to another cocaine baby. The message is that this community cannot afford
to have two or three cocaine babies from the same person.'""
Incapacitation is founded on the premise that a dangerous person
removed from society cannot hurt others; thus society is protected. 2
The goal of incapacitation is to deny the incarcerated individual the
opportunity to commit further offenses.' Incapacitation should be
intertwined closely with rehabilitaton because "resorting to restraint
without accompanying rehabilitative efforts is unwise, as the vast majority
of prisoners will ultimately be returned to society."' If a pregnant
addict could seek help in a treatment clinic and isolate herself from the
allure of the street, no criminal prosecutions would be necessary. Kim
Hardy was struggling to remain free from drugs, but when she was visited
by a few friends who were using crack, she started using drugs again.'
Hardy said, "[t]he more I sat there and watched them, the more I wanted
to, you know, use the drug and eventually I did."'
B. Alternatives to Criminal Prosecutions
If more federal and state government aid could be channelled into
developing female-oriented drug-treatment programs, then drug-addicted
women, the vast majority of whom are poor and minorities, would not
have to confront criminal prosecutions. 7 In New York City, Mayor
240. See Moss, supra note 206, at 1414 (concluding that it is tragic to punish a drugaddicted mother for her disease, rather than to provide her with treatment and help to
recover). See also Lewin, supra note 208, at A14 (referring to Wendy Chavkin's statement
that prosecuting Jennifer Johnson for failing to get help, when nobody would provide it,
hardly seems fair).
241. Curriden, supra note 39, at 51 (quoting Florida Prosecutor Jeff Dean).
242. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 167, at 22.
243. See id.
244. Id.
245. See 60 Minutes, supra note 43, at 9.

246. Id.
247. See Mariner et al., supra note 202, at 37; see also Chavkin, supra note 11, at
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David Dinkins announced the formation of a study group, chaired by
former Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, to develop a
coordinated anti-drug plan for the city." One proposed project, which
the study group recommended begin immediately, was designed to provide
drug-abuse services for all pregnant and postpartum addicts seeking
treatment. The services would include "general health care; prenatal and
postnatal care; drug treatment (individual and group therapy, acupuncture,
12-step and other self-help programs); instruction in delivery, parenting,
nutrition and homemaking; counseling for domestic violence and incest
survivors; vocational and educational assessment and referral; and
advocacy for housing and entitlements." 9 The proposed project intends
to model itself on Odyssey House's Mother and Baby on Narcotics
program (MABON), the only residential drug-free program for mothers
and their children in New York State.'
The Mandella House, in Oakland Hills, California, is also a
residential program for drug-addicted mothers and their babies." '
Minnie Thomas, director of the Mandella House, explained that the
environment of the residence is structured so that women learn how to
take care of themselves and their babies. 2 Only six women live in the
Mandella House at one time. 3 They begin their stay during their
pregnancy and remain for twelve to eighteen months after giving birth.
There are very strict rules for the women: no visitors are allowed and the
women must be escorted when they temporarily leave the house.'
Jackie, a woman living in the house, is grateful to be there with her son.
Previously, she could not gain admission into any facility because, as she
said, "[y]ou had to be an alcoholic or not pregnant."2 5
Both New York City's Odyssey House and Oakland Hills' Mandella
House have helped women to become drug free, while simultaneously
2 (stating that "these women need treatment, not prosecution, for their addiction").
248. See NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH Er AL., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE MAYOR ON DRUG ABUSE IN NEW YORK CITY, at preface (1990).
249. Id. at 68.

250. See id. at 30. In 1989, MABON was the only residential treatment program
designed specifically for chemically dependent pregnant women in New York State; yet,

the State Assembly Committee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse estimated that 12,000 babies
were going to be born addicted to drugs in New York City in 1989. See Michael Dorris,

A Desperate CrackLegacy, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 1990, at 8.
251. See Sacramento, California, Local News Program (NBC affiliate KCRA

television broadcast, Jan. 4, 1985).
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. Id.
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addressing perinatal and postnatal needs.' Unfortunately, the programs
have only a limited number of beds available, with hundreds of women on
their waiting lists.' By encouraging every city to develop programs
such as the Odyssey House's MABON program and Mandella House's
program, addicted pregnant women could seek help and avoid
prosecution.258
V.

CONCLUSION

Drug-addicted pregnant women who have drug-exposed babies are
being prosecuted at an alarming rate.2" Many prosecutors are applying
existing drug laws in a novel and unconstitutional fashion.' Florida's
Supreme Court, the highest court in the country to render an opinion on
the delivery of drugs to a newborn infant, unanimously reversed Jennifer
Johnson's conviction on July 23, 1992 .11 The Johnson reversal will
necessarily stop the progression of pending cases in Florida as well as
foreclose any new prosecutions. The question remains, however, whether
other states will follow the Florida Supreme Court's precedent. 2
The blameworthiness of the addict is doubtful because she is suffering
from a disease. As a result, retribution should not be deemed a
justification for punishment.' Similarly, deterrence does not frighten
women into stopping their drug use. Rather, it is more likely to frighten
them away from seeking medical help for fear of being reported to zealous
local prosecutors.'
Rehabilitation remains the only plausible
justification for criminal punishment, but criminal sanctions are not the
best means to achieve the goals of rehabilitation. Instead, the federal and
state governments need to make an effort to provide funds for the
development of female-oriented drug-treatment programs for pregnant
256. See Telephone Interview with Yolanda P., an evening caseworker at the Mandella
House (Mar. 15, 1991) (stating that Mandella House has an eighty-five- to ninety-percent
success rate of women remaining drug free after they leave).
257. See id. (stating that there are 150-200 people on the waiting list).
258. In New York, unfortunately, drug-treatment programs for pregnant mothers and
prenatal care programs were the first to be eliminated in a recent fiscal crisis. See Celia W.
Dugger, New York Losing Weapons Against Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1991, at Al;
Excerpts FromDinkins' Speech: 'OurDifficult JourneyAhead,' N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1991,
at B2.
259. See discussion supra part II.A.
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women. These programs must also be designed to meet the needs of the
poor, so that criminal sanctions need not be imposed.
Julie Petrow*
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